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ABSTRACT: This article challenges two general assumptions that have guided the study of Mexican foreign policy 
in the last four decades. First, that from this policy emerges national consensus; and, secondly that between Mexico 
and the US there is a “special relation” thanks to which Mexico has been able to develop an autonomous foreign 
policy. The two assumptions are discussed in light of the impact on Mexican domestic politics of the 1954 US-
sponsored military coup against the government of government of Guatemala. In Mexico, the US intervention re-
opened a political fracture that had first appeared in the 1930’s, as a result of President Cárdenas’radical policies that 
divided Mexican society. These divisions were barely dissimulated by the nationalist doctrine adopted by the gov-
ernment. The Guatemalan Crisis brought some of them into the open. The Mexican President, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines’ 
priority was the preservation of political stability. He feared the US government might feel the need to intervene in 
Mexico to prevent a serious disruption of the status quo. Thus, Ruiz Cortines found himself in a delicate position in 
which he had to solve the conflicts derived from a divided elite and a fractured society, all this under the pressure of 
US’ expectations regarding a secure southern border. 
KEYWORDS: Cold war; cardenismo; fracture; anti-Communism; intervention; stability; destabilization
Citation / Cómo citar este artículo: Loaeza, Soledad (2015). “The Mexican political fracture and the 1954 coup in Guate-
mala (The beginnings of the cold war in Latin America)”. Culture & History Digital Journal, 4 (1): e006. doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.3989/chdj.2015.006
RESUMEN: La fractura política Mexicana y el golpe de 1954 en Guatemala (Los incios de la guerra fría en 
América Latina).- Este artículo ofrece una discusión crítica de dos presupuestos generales que han orientado el 
estudio de la política exterior mexicana en las últimas cuatro décadas. Primero, que la política exterior es forja-
dora de un consenso nacional; y segundo, que entre México y Estados Unidos existe una relación especial que le 
ha permitido a México desarrollar una política exterior independiente. Ambos presupuestos se analizan a la luz 
del impacto del golpe militar que patrocinó el gobierno de Estados Unidos contra el gobierno de Guatemala en 
1954. En México, la intervención de Estados Unidos en Guatemala provocó la reapertura de una fractura política 
que había surgido durante el gobierno radical de Lázaro Cárdenas, y que la doctrina nacionalista disimulaba. La 
crisis guatemalteca la reanimó y promovió movilizaciones que a ojos del Presidente Ruiz Cortines, comprome-
tían la estabilidad política y abrían la puerta a la intervención de Estados Unidos, que consideraba crucial la es-
tabilidad de su frontera sur. Ruiz Cortines estaba en una situación muy delicada, porque tenía que resolver los 
conflictos de una sociedad fracturada y de una elite dividida, bajo la presión de las demandas de estabilidad de 
Washington.
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In June 1954 the CIA sponsored the overthrow of the 
Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz. This intervention 
is an established historical fact. In 1999 President Bill 
Clinton in a visit to Guatemala said: “Support for mili-
tary forces and intelligence units which engaged in vio-
lence and widespread repression was wrong, and the 
United States must not repeat that mistake” (Barrett, 
2011: 23). This action was similar to the covert opera-
tion the Eisenhower administration undertook the year 
before against President Mossadegh in Iran. In Wash-
ington the same cause explained both cases: Soviet ex-
pansion. The relevance of the Guatemalan episode lies 
in that it is at the origin of decades of instability and in-
ternal strife in Latin American countries. In Guatemala 
itself it was the beginning of more than four decades of 
military rule and repression (Blanton, 2008; Cullather, 
2006; Rabe, 2012).
Washington’s aggression against a constitutional gov-
ernment that had been democratically elected triggered a 
wave of protest throughout the region soured inter-Amer-
ican relations and gave a dramatic meaning to the notion 
sphere of influence. Protests against the US dissolved 
shortly after Árbenz’ downfall. However, the intervention 
left a lasting mark on the perception Latin Americans had 
of the United States, and on the internal dynamics of the 
countries of the region. As Stephen G. Rabe says, “Guate-
mala served as the training ground for subsequent US in-
terventions in countries like Cuba, Brazil, British Guiana 
and Chile.” (Rabe, 2008: 53). It also conveyed to Latin 
Americans the message that the Good Neighbor policy 
belonged to the past.
The impact of these events on Mexican domestic poli-
tics is rarely examined, (Buchenau, 2004; Pellicer, 1965-
1966; Robinson, 1987) even though almost ten years later, 
the Cuban Revolution had a similar effect. This experi-
ence by contrast, has been a subject of interest to many 
scholars (Covarrubias, 2008; Fenn, 1963; Keller, 2012; 
Pellicer, 1968; Pellicer, 1972). In Mexico, the operation 
against Árbenz in 1954 produced reactions analogous to 
those that accompanied the Cuban events: it stirred up 
protests among university students and teachers; divided 
the political elite, and within the middle-classes it reo-
pened a political fracture that had first appeared in the thir-
ties. Former President Lázaro Cárdenas was at the heart of 
this division. His government’s radical policies (1934-
1940) precipitated the politicization of Mexican society, 
instigating an ideological confrontation between social-
ists, nationalists, Catholics and Communists. The conflicts 
were so severe that the country seemed to be on the brink 
of a civil war. The Second World War introduced a truce 
that was the basis of long-term stability.
The political fracture that split Mexican society and 
elite at the end of Cárdenas’ term of office was reopened 
by the cold war. This was among the most salient effects 
of the 1954 crisis in the US-Guatemala relation. The 
conflict replicated the USSR/US rivalry at the local lev-
el. In Mexico it also exposed the persistence of the an-
tagonism that opposed cardenistas and anti-cardenistas. 
Thus, in the Summer of 1954 the political debate in 
Mexico was set by an external issue, the US interven-
tion in Guatemala. 
In March 1954 the X Inter-American Conference 
took place in Caracas. At issue was the presumed Com-
munist influence on the Guatemalan government. Secre-
tary of State, John Foster Dulles’ intention was to con-
demn the Guatemalan government and prepare a 
collective intervention against it. Mexico’s position at 
this conference seemed to adhere to a tradition of au-
tonomy in foreign policy. The Mexican delegation did 
not give in to the US pressure, and when the anti-Com-
munist resolution was submitted by the US delegation to 
the assembly, Mexico abstained from voting. For Ruiz 
Cortines, this stance did not imply a rejection of Wash-
ington’s anti-Communist crusade or the commitment to 
a continuous support of the Guatemalan reformist gov-
ernment. After Árbenz fell, the Mexican President dis-
tanced himself from the Guatemalan exiles’ and took 
harsh measures against Communists in Mexico. What is 
the explanation for this apparent contradiction? What 
was the impact of the cold war on Mexican politics? 
What were the Mexican president’s goals? What was the 
link between internal and external policies?
Two broad assumptions guide most of scholarly re-
search on Mexican foreign policy of the second half of 
the twentieth century: first that foreign policy is a source 
of national consensus (Ojeda, 1976: 105; Meyer, 2010). 
Second, that Mexico and the US had a “special relation-
ship”, an “understanding”. According to which the two 
countries “agreed to disagree” on matters of international 
politics that did not involve strategic interests of either 
country. This agreement would be the basis of a relatively 
autonomous Mexican foreign policy (Ojeda, 1976: 93).
The Guatemalan episode of 1954 disproves both as-
sumptions. First, Mexican public opinion and the elite 
were divided. There was sharp disagreement on the gov-
ernment’s policy towards Guatemala, and on the extent of 
Communist influence in the Árbenz government. Second, 
at the end of the crisis President Ruiz Cortines joined 
Washington’s policy intended to “extirpate” Communist 
influence from the hemisphere.
The assumption that foreign policy creates national 
consensus is difficult to sustain when examining its impli-
cations. First, it implies that internal stability depends on 
it. There is no evidence to support this claim that overes-
timates the meaning of foreign policy for Mexican socie-
ty. At the same time, it underestimates the divisive effects 
of international politics in a politically diverse society. 
For instance, in 1936 Mexican public opinion was pro-
foundly divided regarding the support President Lázaro 
Cárdenas gave to the Spanish Republic, again in 1942, on 
the declaration of war against the Axis, and after 1945 
there was no unanimity with respect of the post- war alli-
ance with the US (Sola Ayape, 2014; Archivo Manuel 
Gómez Morín, [AMGM] Instituto Tecnológico Autóno-
mo de México).1 In spite of bitter disagreement within 
Mexican society, internal balances did not collapse. For-
eign policy was not conducive to internal reconciliation, 
but the nationalist discourse and the PRI hegemony dis-
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simulated the differences. Secondly, between Mexico and 
the US there was no long-term “agreement to disagree”, 
rather short-term bargains renewed in accordance with 
the conditions of the immediate context. In 1954 the mar-
gin of maneuver of the Mexican President was defined by 
Eisenhower’s narrow interpretation of Soviet aims and 
strategy. This margin was broader in the context of John 
Kennedy´s less intransigent and exacting foreign policy. 
Ariel Rodríguez Kuri claims that President Ruiz Cort-
ines represents the apex of the success of Mexican au-
thoritarianism. According to him, Ruiz Cortines was the 
beneficiary of a consolidated political consensus achieved 
thanks to political stability and sustained economic 
growth (Rodríguez Kuri, 2008). The focus of Rodríguez 
Kuri’s analysis is the presidency as an institution persis-
tently threatened by local caciques or dissidents from the 
revolutionary elite. However, by the beginning of the fif-
ties it had finally stabilized. A broad perspective of the 
political system outbalances Rodriguez Kuri’s consensus 
and exposes fissures, cracks and cleavages concealed by 
an imaginary all-powerful Presidency.
Ruiz Cortines’ ambivalence or lack of enthusiasm for 
the reformist policies the arbencistas called the “Guate-
malan primavera” was primarily a defensive reaction that 
indicates profound fractures in Mexican society. The 
President’s priority was the preservation of political sta-
bility. Ideological antagonisms, socioeconomic and re-
gional differences divided Mexican society. Stability was 
fragile in a fractured society where the elite in power was 
torn and the nationalist call seemed insufficient to build 
consensus. The Guatemalan crisis increased the destabi-
lizing potential of these divisions. There were other caus-
es of discontent, such as the Partido Revolucionario In-
stitucional, PRI,’s virtual monopoly of political 
participation, rigged elections, inflation and the exasper-
ating poverty of rural Mexico. The conditions of the 
country were difficult the first three years of Ruiz Cort-
ines’ term of office: economic growth slowed down, 
while demographic growth accelerated, disagreements 
derived from a conflicting presidential election in 1952. 
Alienated segments of the middle classes from the gov-
ernment, and inflation created unrest among workers’ 
unions.
The Mexican President feared that the extension of 
the protest against US intervention would lead to a large 
and complex mobilization. Ruiz Cortines anticipated a 
conservative reaction to an emboldened left. Such a de-
velopment could easily lead to the proliferation of pro-
tests, and to an anti-government mobilization. In that 
event, the powerful neighbor might be tempted to inter-
vene to reestablish in Mexico a stability that was impor-
tant to its security. Mexico’s apprehension was not 
groundless since interventionism was a central compo-
nent of the US cold war policy. The Guatemalan episode 
confirmed the observation of a US diplomat, that Latin 
Americans were more afraid of US interventionism than 
of Guatemalan Communism.2
Ruiz Cortines’ Guatemalan policy sought to satisfy 
the demands both of the left-wing of the official party, 
and of the conservatives that joined anti-Communist or-
ganizations and demonstrations. The President would de-
fend self-determination when he addressed the Mexican 
left, and attack Communism when talking to Mexican 
anti-Communists, the private sector or the Catholic hier-
archy. At the same time, south of the border the US need-
ed a stable and reliable neighbor. President Ruiz Cortines 
had to guarantee Mexico’s political stability to the US 
government. The differing positions and views of rele-
vant political actors restricted Ruiz Cortines’ options. He 
tried to keep a delicate balance between antagonistic 
pressures by playing what could be seen as a duplicitous 
game.
President Ruiz Cortines’ policy towards Guatemala 
has been harshly criticized. Jürgen Buchenau describes it 
as “the abandonment of revolutionary principles” achiev-
ing a “feeble balance”; (Buchenau, 2004: 119-120). Nan-
cy Robinson attributes the “lukewarm support” of Arbenz 
to the predominantly conservative atmosphere of the 
country and to “traditionally conflicting” relations be-
tween Mexico and Guatemala; (Robinson, 1987: 232). 
Buchenau and Robinson argue that Ruiz Cortines’ policy 
was designed to accommodate the US and the Mexican 
private sector’s pressures. Their conclusion is correct but 
their analyses are incomplete. The restrictions weighing 
upon the presidential decision-making derived also from 
divisions within the political elite, and from the opposing 
views of cardenistas and anticardenistas.
The Mexican President’s goals were contradictory: he 
had to reconcile internal demands with external pressures, 
among which the US pressure was the most threatening. 
US strategy against the expansion of Soviet influence in 
Latin America destabilized the regional status quo and 
the internal balance of the countries where the US inter-
vened. The battle against Communism shifted internal 
balances in these countries, and this produced the destabi-
lizing consequences the alleged Communist offensive the 
US was trying to attack. The repercussions of this strate-
gy were more disturbing than the impact of the policies it 
sought to check. The Mexican experience was exception-
al among Latin American countries in that the govern-
ment succeeded in keeping the US away from the coun-
try’s domestic politics. Thus, a powerful cause of 
instability, direct US intervention, was absent from Mexi-
can politics.
This article shows, first, that Mexican foreign policy 
was another source of division within Mexican society 
because it was a reflection of an internal fracture; and, 
secondly, that political stability depended on the govern-
ment’s ability to stop the mobilization of opposing 
groups. Mexican foreign policy could be charged of hav-
ing two faces because it sought to dissolve tensions be-
tween antagonistic forces: cardenistas and anticardenis-
tas. Political stability depended on the agreement of the 
left, as much as on that of conservative segments of pub-
lic opinion, the anticardenistas, the Catholic Church and 
business organizations. Ruiz Cortines’ needed also to 
maintain a cordial relation with the US. He also had to 
convince the US government that he had the capacity to 
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guarantee stability, and persuade the US agencies and 
representatives that he could do so without US help. 
In order to address this hypothesis, I begin by describ-
ing the impact of the cold war in Mexico and the rise of 
conservatism as a general atmosphere that enveloped the 
country; a section of this first part is dedicated to the 
cardenismo/anticardenismo fracture; secondly, I explore 
the US —Mexico relation within the framework of the 
US cold war Latin American policy, and the third part 
discusses President Ruiz Cortines’ response to the Guate-
malan crisis and its repercussions on the strategy of inter-
nal political actors.
ThE COLD WAR iN MExiCO
The transformation of the US into a superpower was 
the most momentous change affecting Mexico in the 
post-War period. A century after the 1847 war, the signifi-
cant asymmetries that in the past were already significant 
in 1946 became incomparable. In terms of population 
alone, in that year Mexico had a population of 23 million; 
the United States had 145 million and was the world’s 
leading industrial, economic and military power. Its size, 
geographical proximity and its offensive capabilities rep-
resented a threat to Mexico, whose government lived in 
constant apprehension of its neighbor’s propensity to in-
tervene in the domestic politics of other countries. The 
cold war accentuated this proclivity. 
The cold war was a global phenomenon that in each 
country took the features of the local environment (Fein, 
2008: 204). In Mexico it gave rise to a powerful conserv-
ative atmosphere in a context of rapid social change, pop-
ulation growth, weak institutions and pronounced social 
inequalities. These processes and the tensions of a world 
that seemed to be on the verge of a nuclear war justified 
the concentration of power and the centralization of deci-
sion-making processes. Thus, the international context 
contributed to the authoritarian regime’s consolidation. 
Three fundamental pieces shaped the political system: a 
centralized State, the presidency and the PRI. The hegem-
onic party was the main instrument of political control 
and the pillar of an extended clientelistic structure, that 
was central to the “diffuse support” many Mexicans gave 
their political system (Coleman, 1976). This system dis-
couraged political participation because stability rested 
mostly on conformity, controlled participation and 
repression.
In Mexico, the international context antagonism be-
tween Liberal Democracy and Totalitarian Communism 
was juxtaposed with existing political divisions namely 
the political fracture that separated cardenistas and anti-
cardenistas. The cold war became the framework of ref-
erence for the Communist Party and for the Catholic 
Church. It redefined their position in the political system 
and the terms of the political debate, and it altered the 
balance of power. This framework helped the post-war 
Presidents undermine the cardenista coalition that up un-
til 1948 included peasants’ and labor organizations that 
remained loyal to cardenismo, and a significant segment 
of the intellectual, elite and of the middle classes. It also 
included a current of the PRI represented by Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano, a successful union leader. In 1936 
Lombardo founded the powerful Confederación de Tra-
bajadores de México, CTM, Confederación de Traba-
jadores de América Latina, CTAL, that in 1945 represent-
ed 300 thousand workers.
In the bipolar world, the ascent of the US was also 
felt in the realm of culture and ideas. In Mexico it grad-
ually became predominant at the expense of the Euro-
pean influence that until the Second World War had been 
a protecting shield against US overwhelming power. 
Many Mexicans resented this influence. PRI ideologues 
conceived a nationalist doctrine intended to resist the 
appeal of US mass culture, solidify the Mexican identi-
ty, and foster traditional values. The nationalist doctrine 
was also meant to give ideological support to the re-
gime. Inevitably, it had a significant component of anti-
US attitudes that could easily turn into anti-Imperialistic 
manifestations, and often it carried a reflex reaction to 
side with the US adversaries. Therefore, anti-US pro-
tests could sound as pro-Communist or pro-Soviet atti-
tudes and statements. However, Mexico adhered volun-
tarily to the anti-Communist crusade the US President, 
Dwight Eisenhower, launched as soon as he took office 
(1952-1956). 
The increasing influence of US culture was a matter 
of concern for Mexican elites. In 1947, Daniel Cosío Vil-
legas, the liberal historian and political commentator, 
wrote that US’ influence crushed Mexico. It changed eve-
rything: food, fashion, political ideas, the language. It 
was like the Christian God: almighty and everywhere 
(Cosío Villegas, 1966, I: 202). 
The growing influence of the Catholic Church was a 
reaction to the US cultural influence, but the Church also 
played a significant role of social control. Historically, it 
had been critical of the influence of the “American way of 
life”, of the liberal habits of women and of the frequency 
of divorce in US society. Nevertheless, after 1945 the 
Church and the US embassy met in the anti-Communist 
crusade, although there was a fundamental difference be-
tween anti-Communism in the US and anti-Communism 
in Mexico. The former’s emphasis was on civil liberties, 
by contrast, the latter was a patriotic defense of religion 
and the family. 
The change in the position of the Catholic Church on 
the political stage had a decisive impact on Mexican soci-
ety and domestic politics. The 1917 Constitution con-
tained a number of anticlerical dispositions intended to 
subordinate the Church to State authority and to limit its 
influence on society (These dispositions were eliminated 
in 1991). In the years of revolutionary radicalism, the 
Church was persecuted and fought a three-year war 
against the State (1926-1929). However, when Mexico 
entered the Second World War, the Church responded to 
the government’s call for national unity and was incorpo-
rated into the post-revolutionary regime.
The presumed “Communist offensive” and the vig-
orous anti-Communist crusade of the Vatican inspired a 
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religious revival. Catholic propaganda flooded Mexican 
homes. In violation of constitutional dispositions forbid-
ding the political usage of religion and the clergy’s par-
ticipation in politics by the 1940’s Church authorities 
became regular guests at official ceremonies. A number 
of Vatican representatives visited Mexico; closer ties de-
veloped between the Catholic Church in Mexico and US 
Catholics. The Archbishop of New York, Francis Cardi-
nal Spellman, assumed the functions of Vicar of the Vat-
ican in Latin America. The streets of Mexican cities pro-
vided the stage for religious celebrations. It was no 
secret that ecclesiastical authorities maintained constant 
exchanges with the President. In a 1955 interview with 
Time Magazine, Archbishop Luis María Martínez de-
clared “Faith is stronger than law”, he added that the 
only thing missing was a constitutional reform.3 (Time, 
09/ May/ 1955).
The strength of conservatism did not result in the de-
velopment of a strong Catholic party. The Catholic 
Church could be the center of an alternative to the PRI, 
but its relations with the State were so close and complex 
if undefined, that Catholic authorities would not risk a 
confrontation. Thus, in Mexico Catholics remained tied 
to an extreme traditionalism that preached depoliticiza-
tion and adherence to the nationalist doctrine (Loaeza, 
1988: 160-169). The close collaboration between Church 
and State hampered the development of an independent 
organization that would channel the institutional partici-
pation of right-wing sympathizers.
In this conservative setting, few objective elements 
justified the anti-Communist alarm. The relations be-
tween Mexico and the Soviet Union were rather poor. 
Mexico was the first Latin American country to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet regime in 1925, how-
ever, they were interrupted after the Comintern directed 
the Partido Comunista Mexicano, PCM, to undertake 
revolutionary actions against the Mexican government in 
1930 (Cárdenas,1993; Spenser,1999). Relations were re-
established during the war. From then on Mexican Com-
munists were consistently dependent on the “official left” 
represented by cardenismo and Lombardo Toledano. 
The Mexican Revolution was the main obstacle to the 
development of Communism. The space this political 
force could have filled was taken by what was called rev-
olutionary radicalism as practiced by President Cárdenas. 
During his term of office, the PCM followed the Popular 
Front strategy established by the Comintern, thus becom-
ing a minor ally to the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, 
PNR, in power. The Central de Trabajadores de México, 
CTM, founded by Lombardo Toledano in 1936, virtually 
monopolized the control of workers’ organizations. Ac-
cording to documents in the Soviet archives, for the So-
viet government Lombardo was the real leader of the 
Mexican working class.4 US and British intelligence con-
sidered him a “dangerous” and powerful man, the number 
1 Soviet agent in Latin America (Spenser, 2010). His po-
litical goals, his technique and the propaganda he dissem-
inated were “identical” to those of “active Communist 
units”.5
The 1950’s was a difficult decade for Mexican Com-
munists. The PCM agonized for lack of resources, but 
also because of the relentless persecution by the govern-
ment against its members. Police forces raided regularly 
the party’s meetings and offices, and its leaders were in-
carcerated. The organization was further weakened by in-
ternal disputes and purges. According to a 1948 CIA re-
port the number of card-carrying Communists in Mexico 
City was uncertain but not higher than one thousand.6 In 
1951 the party failed to gather the 30 thousand member-
ship the law required, therefore, it lost official registra-
tion. In 1958 it had less than 5 thousand members in the 
whole of Mexico, whereas the CP in Argentina had 70 
thousand members, in Brazil 50 thousand and in Cuba 12 
thousand.7 Mexican Communists depended on former 
President Cárdenas and Lombardo Toledano neither of 
which belonged to the party, however, both had direct ac-
cess to the Soviet Communist party and to the Soviet 
government.
In the eyes of US intelligence agencies, Mexico was 
not an entirely reliable ally. First, the President, the PRI 
and union leaders made constant references to the Mexi-
can revolution in an equivocal manner in the cold war 
context. Also, the line separating nationalism from anti-
US statements and policies was tenuous. The main com-
plaint the CIA had on Mexico’s anti-Communist battle 
concerned the role the country played as a meeting point 
for Communists from all Latin America and other coun-
tries.8 In 1948, according to the agency’s report, the 
most important international Communist meetings out-
side the USSR were held in Mexico with delegates from 
Europe and Latin America in attendance. There they 
took decisions which “threatened the strategic interests 
of the United States.”9 According to the report, the Mex-
ican government did not help the Communists, never-
theless Mexico was “the main tactical area of Commu-
nism in the Western Hemisphere”.10 (NACP, CIA, 1949). 
However, the authors of this report missed that by 1954 
revolution in Mexico was a historical chapter not a po-
litical option.
A fractured elite and a divided society: Cardenismo 
and anti-Cardenismo
President Lázaro Cárdenas revitalized the Mexican 
Revolution that in the twenties had fallen into the hands 
of the last generation of generals who had fought in the 
civil war. He mobilized workers and peasants; encour-
aged their organization, began an extensive land reform, 
introduced labor legislation, and nationalized the oil in-
dustry. The image of President Cárdenas became forever 
tied to the defense of the underprivileged. His policies 
were associated to a strong State, anticlericalism, State-
controlled schools and expropriations. Cárdenas was pop-
ular with workers and peasants, but he was unpopular 
with the bourgeoisie and large segments of the middle 
classes. The roots of the most consequential political frac-
ture of XXth century Mexico are to be found in his ad-
ministration (Knight, 1994).
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The positions and proposals of cardenistas were more 
consistent and better articulated than those of anti-card-
enistas who were a heterogeneous lot: some of them were 
prominent members of the private sector or their employ-
ees; the majority upheld Catholic traditions rejecting the 
Revolution’s legacy of policies and institutions. Anti-
cardenismo marshalled the PAN, the ultraconservative 
Unión Nacional Sinarquista, UNS, and other Catholic 
and business organizations. These groups may have been 
large but their lack of organization made them relatively 
weak. They never found a leader similar to Cárdenas or 
Lombardo to unify them. Besides, they tended to shun 
political participation and only gained some coherence in 
times of crisis, or when they were facing a challenge, 
such as the return of Cárdenas and the organization of the 
left.
The image of Lázaro Cárdenas remained firmly root-
ed in many Mexicans’ imagination even after he left of-
fice. He was influential with politicians and government 
officials. He often intervened on behalf of workers or 
peasants, to demand the President to help solve a conflict 
involving unions or agrarian leagues.11 However, he was 
a contradictory figure: he challenged presidential authori-
ty, and was at the heart of the political fracture that erod-
ed the PRI’s hegemony. At the same time, Cárdenas was 
at the center of the official party’s legitimacy given that 
he was an essential protagonist of the post-revolutionary 
State.
Cárdenas political comeback was a reaction to 
Washington’s increasing hostility against reformist 
governments in Latin America, and to the Eisenhow-
er’s administration proclivity to intervene, plan covert 
operations, subversive actions and negative propagan-
da campaigns. He believed that US hegemony was de-
stroying national sovereignty in Latin America. The 
former President became the self-appointed represent-
ative of a growing anti-US sentiment shared by many 
Mexicans who thought that the US exploited Latin 
American countries and gave nothing in return. This 
attitude was fed by the persistent refusal of the US to 
support Latin American countries’ economic develop-
ment.12 Cárdenas’ criticisms of US policy appealed to 
many Mexicans who had been affected by the govern-
ment’s restrictive economic policy, or for whom the 
significant increase of foreign direct investments was a 
cause of alarm.13
Also, US cold war policy was probably one of the 
reasons why the former President became close to Latin 
American Communists and Soviet-sponsored organiza-
tions. This move was somewhat surprising because 
when he was President he kept the Communists at a dis-
tance (Carr, 1982: 62-63). Nevertheless, he was a pru-
dent politician. As already said, he avoided confronta-
tion particularly with the President. The wish to remain 
in good terms with the President may be the reason he 
spent so much time and energy in international issues 
and eluded domestic affairs. Latin American themes en-
abled Cárdenas to become a leader of opinion within 
and outside the PRI. His followers shared his criticisms 
of the conservative policies of his successors in the 
presidency. In all likelihood, President Ruiz Cortines 
preferred Cárdenas participating in discussions on the 
arms race and world peace, than discussing minimum 
wages in Mexico. This Presidential strategy of leading 
Cárdenas to international issues had long-term conse-
quences on the relationship of the Mexican left and for-
eign policy, making it an area of policy-making identi-
fied with cardenista postures. Also, an institutional 
pattern was developed that set Mexico’s commitment to 
democracy, or any progressive cause, in the realm of 
foreign relations. For decades, the official left tended to 
concentrate in this area, to specialize in these matters 
and to see foreign policy as its territory. This “transac-
tion” was reached at the expense of consistency of an 
authoritarian regime which in the outside world fought 
for democracy.
Throughout the second half of the forties, Cárdenas 
extended his leadership to Central America. He sought to 
articulate a nationalist and anti-imperialistic defense of 
Latin American countries. In doing so, he became in-
volved in a dense network of contacts with foreign organ-
izations, many of them linked to international Commu-
nism. In 1948 he was elected member of the Honor 
Committee of the Congress of Trade-Unions Unity, and 
the Cuban Communist leader, Juan Marinello invited him 
to be vice president of the World Peace Conference, a So-
viet organization (NACP, CIA, 1954).14 In 1956, Cárde-
nas was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize by the Soviet 
government.
Cárdenas’ return to the political stage assembled his 
adversaries, those who thought he personified the Com-
munist influence. In the fifties, the two most important 
newspapers in Mexico City, Excelsior and El Univer-
sal, sustained a prolonged and violent anti-cardenista 
campaign (Servín, 2004). The UNS spearheaded a vio-
lent charge against him, accusing him of planning a re-
turn to power only now as a Moscow agent. The con-
servative weekly La Nación offers an ample repertory 
of anti-Cárdenas attacks. In June 1954, in the midst of 
the Guatemalan crisis, the magazine stated that Cárde-
nas’ utmost interest was “state-sponsored, left-wing 
Communism”. It also referred to his government’s poli-
cies as “cruel and inept experiments”.15 La Nación ex-
plained that Cárdenas was taking advantage of events 
in Guatemala to agitate in Mexico which it said, he 
flooded with declarations and statements, while stirring 
unrest in the countryside.16
The cardenismo/anticardenismo antagonism tran-
scended Cárdenas himself and his term of office. It be-
came a historical fracture, a long-standing feature of the 
Mexican political landscape of the second half of the 
XXth century and a pivot for a wide range of political 
forces and options. At times of intense politicization, the 
fracture became visible and framed the conflict of the mo-
ment. In 1954, it played its part in the Communist/anti-
Communist dispute; in 1961, it provided the background 
for the founding of the Movimiento de Liberación Na-
cional, inspired by the Cuban revolution. In 1988, when it 
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finally split from its roots, the PRI, it articulated the left-
wing opposition to neo-liberal policies. In the XXIst cen-
tury cardenismo continues to be a reference for all politi-
cal forces.
MExiCO iN PRESiDENT EiSENhOWER’S LATiN 
AMERiCAN COLD WAR POLiCY 
At first glance, the post-war international order ap-
peared not to have significantly altered relations between 
countries in the hemisphere; it had simply consolidated 
the United States’ hegemony and accentuated the region’s 
relative isolation from the rest of the world. In 1945, the 
rule of the Monroe Doctrine was acknowledged as a le-
gitimate reference for all countries in the continent —ex-
cept Canada— at the 1945 Chapultepec Conference in 
Mexico City. The Act of Chapultepec consecrated the 
Doctrine on the assumption that anti-Communism was 
the cornerstone of a political identity shared by all nations 
in the Hemisphere.
Because of his military background Eisenhower’s for-
eign policy perspective was deeply influenced by geopo-
litical and strategic considerations. His view was embed-
ded in the Monroe Doctrine.17 Anticommunism took a 
predominant place in Eisenhower’s thinking. It led his 
administration to an “unabashed embrace of anti-Com-
munist military dictatorships and its unwillingness to crit-
icize, however mutedly, rampant political and civil re-
pression in Latin America.” (Rabe, 1988: 40-41). At the 
same time, the acknowledgment of Latin America’s stra-
tegic importance did not make Eisenhower change his 
view regarding the economic development of the region. 
He firmly believed it should rely primarily on resources 
supplied by trade and private investment (Rabe, 1988: 
66). Consequently, the Eximbank long-term lending was 
frozen, “the banks development loans in Latin America 
fell from 147 million in 1952 to 7.6 million in 1953.” 
(Rabe, 1988: 66). 
Eisenhower’s policy towards Mexico was nuanced in 
that he would seek to understand this country’s needs be-
fore acting on uninformed assumptions, as it apparently 
happened in other countries. Guatemala seems to be an 
egregious example of this kind of policy-making. In this 
respect Mexico held a privileged position. Eisenhower 
would often ask the US ambassador directly for informa-
tion about the Mexico’s internal situation by-passing the 
State Department. Thus, at this particular stage of the 
cold war, the Mexican government could use the US fear 
of Soviet expansion to its advantage. It leveraged the 
country’s geographical location within the North Ameri-
can security perimeter to ensure a different treatment to 
that given other countries in the region. This would be the 
basis for the “special relation” between the two countries. 
At the same time, the US-USSR rivalry hardened the re-
strictions on “the country’s freedom of political action” 
(Ojeda, 1974: 92). The deterioration of the relation be-
tween the superpowers, the intensification of internation-
al tensions and the threat of a nuclear war inhibited Mexi-
co’s diplomatic activity.
The Mexican government adopted two strategies to 
cope with the power of the United States. First, it assimi-
lated the main restrictions deriving from territorial conti-
guity, as if these limitations were self-imposed. For ex-
ample, regarding international alliances Mexico knew it 
could never approach the Soviet Union. It also acknowl-
edged that socialism was not an alternative for a country 
that was the neighbor and weak ally, of the most ferocious 
adversary of that ideology and political regime. 18 Second-
ly, the nationalist doctrine developed by the PRI included 
a commitment to democracy. As a result, anti-Commu-
nism took a prominent place in the official PRI doctrine. 
This addition turned out to be useful for the government 
that was seeking to weaken the cardenista coalition, 
many of whose members were identified as Communists.
At the time, democracy was understood as a long-
term process. Washington accepted the Mexican regime 
as a “democracy in the making” the more praiseworthy 
because it was able to maintain political stability. Eisen-
hower repeatedly talked about his wish to foster coopera-
tion with Mexico, which he considered different to other 
Latin American countries, simply because it shared with 
the US a border stretching more than 1 800 miles. This 
fact bore a special meaning for a military man, who was 
also fighting a war, of a fundamentally diplomatic and 
ideological nature, but one that could become an armed 
conflict at any moment. Under those conditions, it was 
clearly advisable to maintain good relations with a neigh-
bor whose territory could be useful in the worst case 
scenario.19
In October 1953, when the preparations for the coup 
against Árbenz were gathering pace, the Presidents of 
Mexico and the United States met at the inauguration of 
the Falcon Dam on the border between Tamaulipas and 
Texas. In his welcoming speech, Eisenhower compared 
the two countries with two friends who shared “the kind 
of friendship that seeks–seeks earnestly and persistently 
to understand the viewpoint of the other, and then labor 
with sympathy and with all that is in the heart to meet the 
viewpoint of his friend.” (The New York Times, 20/ 10/ 
1953). He offered Mexico help and talked about the coun-
try’s specific needs of technical assistance, educational 
opportunities and capital. Ruiz Cortines’ public response 
was a defense of general and abstract principles: he al-
luded to a threatened international peace. He also spoke 
of national sovereignty and self-determination as priority 
issues in the Mexican agenda, as if the ghost of interven-
tion was flying over the friendly meeting.
The press reports suggest that President Eisenhower 
was speaking the language of cooperation, but the Mexi-
can President seemed unimpressed. If the US President 
was indeed offering Mexico a program of economic aid, 
this meeting was a lost opportunity to give the US-Mexi-
co relations a new direction and a wider scope. No mean-
ingful dialog took place between the two Presidents. In-
stead parallel monologues prevailed. There was just one 
subject on which both agreed explicitly: the need to fight 
Communism and the preservation of Mexican political 
stability that Eisenhower was prepared to bolster.20
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This political and ideological alliance was the founda-
tion of an essentially cordial bilateral relation. In Secre-
tary Dulles’ opinion a balance of expectations had been 
struck between Mexico and the US: “We know what to 
expect from Mexico and understand her limitations. The 
same is true of Mexico’s attitude towards the United 
States although it is traditionally colored by vague suspi-
cion of our motives.”21 John Foster Dulles’ views on 
Mexico seem surprisingly balanced and well-informed.22 
At this time of general paranoia, the Mexicans’ ambiva-
lent attitudes and policies toward foreign Communists, or 
the government’s defense of State’s intervention, did not 
disturb the cordiality between the two countries. Accord-
ing to Dulles, Mexico could not see the seriousness of the 
Communist threat, because it had “a tradition of extreme 
liberalism.” He believed the Mexican Revolution had so-
cialist tendencies, but that it was neither Marxist nor had 
a connection to the Soviets. Also, in his opinion, the PRI 
was committed to capitalism and he concluded “there is 
little doubt that in time of crisis Mexico would be on our 
side.” (FRUS, 1952-1954: 1351). John Foster Dulles’ 
analysis of the Mexican situation reveals surprising 
restraint. 
Mexico in the face of US intervention in Guatemala
According to the Mexin Ambassador to the OAS, Luis 
Quintanilla, the covert operation against the Árbenz gov-
ernment was a public secret (AGE, SRE, Exp. Luis Quin-
tanilla, 17/ 01/ 1955). It was in everybody’s minds and 
lips since 1952; the White House, the Department of 
State, and Congress were involved. US senators “knew of 
the operation before, during and immediately after its oc-
currence.” (Barrett, 2011: 24). Their position was “that 
the US government should do whatever it might take, 
short of outright war, to stop ongoing ‘Soviet aggression’ 
in Central America.” (Barrett, 2011: 24). The US press 
openly discussed the administration’s plans to respond to 
the challenge posed by the Communists influence in Gua-
temala. In January 1954, the new US Ambassador in that 
country, John Peurifoy, declared to the press that his 
country would intervene unilaterally in Guatemala if the 
situation continued to deteriorate: “Public opinion in the 
U.S. might force us to take some measures to prevent 
Guatemala from falling into the lap of international Com-
munism. We cannot permit a Soviet republic to be estab-
lished between Texas and the Panama Canal.”23
Mexico was compelled to take a stand at the X Inter-
American Conference the proceedings of which were 
held in Caracas from March 1 to 28, 1954. President Ár-
benz had included members of the Communist party in 
his cabinet, had started an agrarian reform that hurt the 
interests of the oligarchy and the United Fruit Company. 
In the eyes of the CIA and the Department of State these 
measures jeopardized the Hemisphere’s stability because 
they opened the door to Soviet influence. 
Many signs indicated that the removal of Árbenz’s 
government was imminent. The meeting in Caracas was 
scheduled to examine economic issues; however, Secre-
tary Dulles used it as a platform to condemn Communism 
and the Guatemalan government, and to prepare a collec-
tive intervention. It was the intention of the Resolution 
advanced by the US delegation at the conference, to 
achieve both ends. At the plenary session of March 8, the 
Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, Luis Padilla 
Nervo, answered to Secretary Dulles’ Resolution defend-
ing the principles of self-determination and non-interven-
tion. His arguments were clear and consistent, but they 
were presented in general and abstract terms, never refer-
ring to Árbenz’ government or Guatemala, in particular.24 
The Mexican minister pointed out that the US delegation 
Resolution was against the Mexican constitution and 
paved the way for foreign intervention in domestic af-
fairs. He proposed two amendments: the first presented 
“International Communism” as any other political doc-
trine that did not by itself represent a threat and had no 
attachments to any particular country; and the second 
sought to preserve the principle of national sovereignty 
leaving the terms of the anti-Communist combat to the 
constitutional rules of each government. The assembly re-
jected both amendments.
Over the course of two weeks, the Secretary of State 
worked tirelessly to push through, with the largest possi-
ble number of votes, Resolution XCIII, “Declaration of 
Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of 
the American States against International Communism 
Intervention”.25 The Resolution stated that “the domina-
tion or control of the political institutions of any Ameri-
can State by the international communist movement, ex-
tending to this hemisphere the political system of an 
extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the 
sovereignty and political independence of the American 
States,” endangering the peace of America (Department 
of State, 1954: 8-9). The Resolution was voted on March 
13. It passed with 17 votes in favor, two abstentions —
Argentina and Mexico26— and Guatemala’s solitary vote 
against. Practically all of the delegates agreed that Com-
munism had no place in the hemisphere, but they also 
unanimously rejected the interventionism that was im-
plicit in the proposed resolution.27
The Mexican game
In normal circumstances, Mexican public opinion was 
indifferent to international politics. But in the Summer of 
1954 it woke up to the cold war tensions of the Guatema-
lan Crisis and the mobilization of a leftist minority de-
manding the government to help Árbenz. Their cause did 
not win unanimous support. Some believed that the Gua-
temalans had been reckless to openly challenge the US. 
Others thought the small country was the victim of a sub-
versive plan. There were those who questioned the idea of 
foreign intervention and saw the conflict as a civil war.
La Nación charged the “creole communists” of seek-
ing to relinquish Mexico to International Communism. It 
further denounced the existence of Communist cells in 
the university and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.28 
(La Nación, 20/ 06/ 1954). After the Guatemalan rebels 
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attack against the government, the president of the PRI, 
General Gabriel Leyva Vázquez stated “…the PRI can 
declare categorically that democratic symbols are Mexi-
co’s banner and that we are against any idea or proposi-
tion contradicting those symbols. Thus, the party rejects 
Communism and any other totalitarian system.”29 As Ma-
nuel Gómez Morín wrote in June 1954, the invasion of 
Guatemala was “the most important issue for Mexican 
public opinion today.” (La Nación, 20/ 06/ 1954). Vicini-
ty, the fear of Communism and the likelihood of the inter-
vention of US troops would explain the unusual interest 
raised by the crisis.
President Ruiz Cortines would have preferred to re-
main on the sidelines and observe the events rather than to 
involve himself in the crisis. Nevertheless, geography and 
the Mexican left imposed themselves. The country was 
restless. A combination of cardenistas and other discon-
tented groups could favor the articulation of protests that 
had other motivations: inflation, the dire conditions of the 
agriculture and farmers, low wages, labor unions unrest. 
The government followed different strategies to meet the 
potential challenge, among them the sponsorship of “in-
dependent organizations” that confronted the left. How-
ever, they were nothing more than a label. For instance, 
the “First Congress against Soviet Intervention in Latin 
America” was inaugurated in Mexico City at the begin-
ning of June. In addition to the participants who came 
from all Latin American countries, the Franco govern-
ment sent a delegation even if Mexico did not have diplo-
matic relations with the Spanish dictatorship. In the open-
ing speech of the Congress, Arturo Amaya, who was also 
secretary of the Sociedad Pro-Liberación de Guatemala, 
thanked President Ruiz Cortines for his political and fi-
nancial support.30
On June 17, Guatemalan rebel troops crossed the bor-
der from Honduras to their country under the orders of 
Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. They had the support of 
Ambassador Peurifoy, and of a psychological offensive 
that made Guatemalans believe that the operation was 
backed by a much larger military force. Called to the de-
fense of the government, the Guatemalan army hesitated 
and fearing the arrival of the US marines it abandoned 
President Árbenz (Gleijeses, 1992: 329-339). On June 26, 
the press announced his resignation.31 He and his family 
took refuge in the Mexican embassy.
The Árbenz family’s decision to seek asylum in the 
Mexican embassy was not surprising. Mexico held a re-
spectable tradition of political asylum that was the pride 
of many members of the Foreign Service; the Mexican 
revolution was always a reference and a model to the Pri-
mavera guatemalteca, mainly the agrarian reform, Mexi-
can engineers having participated in its design. The Mexi-
can left had supported Árbenz from the start, under 
Lázaro Cárdenas leadership. Nevertheless, arbencistas 
may not have realized that in the eyes of many Mexicans 
and of US agencies, this support was proof of their sub-
servience to the Soviet Union.
Vicente Lombardo Toledano was often a guest of the 
Guatemalan government, and he delivered inflammatory 
speeches against US imperialism at multitudinous public 
meetings.32 (NACP, CIA, 1951). His career as union lead-
er peaked during Cárdenas term of office. For the Soviet 
Union Lombardo was the true leader of the Mexican 
working class. Paradoxically, this closeness of Lombar-
do’s to the Soviet Union limited his alliance with Cárde-
nas who staunchly defended self-determination.
The support of such influential political leaders led 
Árbenz to believe that solidarity could be organized be-
tween governments of revolutionary origin.33 Immediate-
ly after the invasion, former President Cárdenas sent a 
letter to Ruiz Cortines suggesting he mediates in the con-
flict (Buchenau, 2004: 136). He refused. It was under-
standable. President Ruiz Cortines was certain that the 
Junta headed by Castillo Armas would decline the offer, 
and that it could have a negative effect on the relation 
with the US. The President did not respond to Cárdenas 
and Lombardo’s entreaties. The Mexican government 
would defend Guatemala from the trenches of multilater-
al diplomacy.
There were other signs of support from the World 
Trade Unions Federation, WTUF; from Lombardo To-
ledano in the name of CTAL; university students and 
teachers took to the streets, manifestos were published in 
the papers. However, the echoes of these protests did not 
go too far because, according to the French paper Le 
Monde, the Mexican press did not report them. 34 For over 
two months, the Mexican embassy in Guatemala shel-
tered 318 refugees, Árbenz and his family included, as 
well as other members of his government, an unusually 
long period. The military junta refused to grant the safe-
conducts they needed to leave the country. In those weeks 
the Embassy endured attacks from Guatemalans who pro-
tested against the Mexican ambassador, Primo Villa 
Michel. He was accused of keeping the doors of the Em-
bassy shut to anti-Communists who were fleeing repres-
sion when Árbenz was still in office.
The Guatemalans in the Mexican embassy, Árbenz in 
particular, were a cause of embarrassment for President 
Ruiz Cortines. The Guatemalan’s presence associated the 
Mexican government with an enemy of the United States. 
The economic situation in Mexico was difficult; in April 
the government had announced a devaluation of the Mex-
ican peso that went from 8.65 per dollar to 12.50 per dol-
lar. The US government support had been crucial for sta-
bilizing the exchange. The time did not seem right for a 
confrontation with the US.
Moreover, the main Mexico City newspapers com-
plained about Árbenz’ presence in the Mexican embassy, 
they even questioned the country’s tradition of political 
asylum. For instance, “Refugees and felons” titled El 
Universal the editorial of July 5, 1954. According to the 
paper, Guatemalan refugees were “political extremists” 
who had engaged in criminal actions in their own coun-
try. The government had to be careful not to admit them 
into Mexican territory where, in all likelihood, they 
would provoke disorder and would try to disseminate 
their “dangerous ideas” (El Universal, 5/ 07/ 1954). In 
mid-July an incident revealed the government´s will to 
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differentiate itself from the Communists. The director of 
the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, INBA, Andrés Idu-
arte, was ipso facto dismissed because he allowed a Com-
munist flag to be placed on the casket of Frida Kahlo, the 
painter and wife of the renowned artist Diego Rivera, a 
Communist himself. The gesture was important because 
it took place in an official ceremony, in which Kahlo’s 
remains were exposed to the public.
The diplomatic relation between Mexico and Guate-
mala was not interrupted. On July 13, Colonel Castillo 
Armas received the Mexican Ambassador Primo Villa 
Michel. This visit was an implicit acknowledgement of 
the new government, founded on the Estrada Doctrine 
that recognizes the right of nations to maintain or substi-
tute their government, without the need for the interna-
tional community to explicitly recognize its legitimacy.
In September, in his annual address to Congress, Pres-
ident Ruiz Cortines briefly mentioned the Guatemalan 
crisis, and concentrated himself instead on the defense of 
self-determination. He also condemned Communism but 
there was no mention of the US intervention, instead Ruiz 
Cortines praised continental solidarity as a contributing 
factor to world peace (XLVIII Legislatura, 1966, IV: 
544).
The Mexican aftermath
Árbenz’fall did not free the Mexican government 
from US pressures. Washington sought to prevent that the 
fallen Guatemalan receive the status of political refugee. 
On August 19, 1954, US ambassador Francis White pre-
sented the Mexican Undersecretary, José Gorostiza, a 
Memorandum containing his government’s suggestions 
for the treatment of Guatemalan political refugees. The 
document has six points that can be resumed in one: 
Communists had to leave the country. The Mexican gov-
ernment could turn them in to the Guatemalan govern-
ment. The Guatemalan courts had already judged them 
and sentenced them for a number of serious crimes, or 
they could be sent to the country of their choice in the 
Soviet bloc (AGE, SRE, Correspondencia de la Embajada 
de E.U.A. 19/ 08/ 1954).
Such a proposition must have shocked and surprised 
the Mexican diplomat. In Mexico the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations was fully committed to the defense of political 
asylum and this tradition was obstinately upheld by the 
minister Padilla Nervo and by Isidro Fabela, a prominent 
jurist that at the end of the war was elected judge at the 
International Court of Justice. The US’ ambassador’s plan 
was ignored by the Ministry. Besides, the Guatemalan 
refugees had the support of the Sociedad de Amigos de 
Guatemala, most of whose members were also members 
of the PCM.35 Former President Cárdenas, may even have 
some of them as his guests in Mexico when they were fi-
nally released in October.36
President Ruiz Cortines grew impatient with the Gua-
temalans in the Embassy. On October 8, Undersecretary 
Gorostiza received a Memorándum from Ruiz Cortines 
private secretary with an underlined header: “By presi-
dential instruction”. The first line stated: “It is in the ur-
gent interest of the Mexican Sate and of the Mexican peo-
ple, now more than ever, to extradite the Guatemalan 
citizen Rosenberg (who had been Árbenz chief of police). 
Extradition has been requested on the grounds of criminal 
charges. It should proceed immediately.” (AGE, SRE, 
“Correspondencia entre la Secretaría de la Presidencia y 
la SRE”, 08-11/ 1954).
The document refers to the President’s exclusive pre-
rogative to grant political asylum and to sign extraditions. 
In its most revealing passage the President’s order de-
scribes the risks that he perceived in the refusal of the US 
government’s request:
The United States of America wants Latin American 
governments to prove with undisputed facts that they 
stand against international Communism sponsored by 
the Soviet Union. Otherwise, internal unrest will sud-
denly appear and not cease until Communism has been 
totally banished from the Americas, on account of this 
region belonging de facto to the United States’ political 
and economic sphere of influence (AGE, SRE, 08-11/ 
1954). 
Here President Ruiz Cortines expressed his major 
fear: “internal unrest”, that could be a coup d’état, or a 
military uprising, something similar to the Guatemalan 
recent crisis. Thus, pressures on Mexico were predomi-
nantly political, probably because economic sanctions 
could hurt US interests as much as Mexico’s. These inter-
ests had become so important that it was preferable to 
leave them undisturbed. The presidential Memorandum 
refers to the extradition of Major Rosenberg as a prece-
dent “of a legal and anti-Communist nature in order to 
save Mexico from U.S. anti-Communist reprisals and dis-
trust.” (AGE, SRE, “Correspondencia entre la Secretaría 
de la Presidencia y la SRE”, 08-11/ 1954). 
RESTLESSNESS iN MExiCO: A GUATEMALAN 
LEGACY?
The three remaining years of Ruiz Cortines´ term of 
office, were a time of anxiety for the government. Stu-
dents, workers and peasants protested, demonstrated on 
the streets, went on strike, occupied private farms, and at-
tempted to organize independently from the PRI. Be-
tween 1955 and 1958 the number of strikes went from a 
135 to 740; Rubén Jaramillo, an agrarian leader in the 
state of Morelos, led an armed group demanding land dis-
tribution. In 1956, students from the Instituto Politécnico 
Nacional, an institution created by President Cárdenas in 
1937, challenged the government’s restrictive economic 
policies and went on strike. However, the army took con-
trol of the Institute’s buildings for a year until normality 
was restored. In 1958 members of the Communist party 
were elected to the railroad’s union leadership as well as 
to the leadership of the teacher’s union. Each of them at-
tempted to break away from the PRI; however, their ac-
tions were shut down by the police, the leaders were ar-
rested and remained in jail for several years. President 
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Ruiz Cortines repeatedly reminded public opinion that he 
“would keep peace [throughout the country] at whatever 
price” (XLVIII Legislatura, 1966, IV: p.562).
At the same time, the Mexican President reinforced 
the PRI. In 1953 women’s right to vote was recognized. 
The party launched an ample affiliation campaign and by 
1955, it announced that party membership had grown by 
three million. In the Presidential election of 1952 it won 
2.7 million, but in the mid-term elections, the PRI re-
ceived 90 per cent of the vote or 5.5 million votes. This 
figure indicates that according to the party’s calculations 
it captured the totality of new voters (Singer, 2010: 
138-169). 
In August 1955, the US ambassador to Mexico, Fran-
cis White wrote President Eisenhower a letter describing 
the excellent relation he had developed with the Mexican 
president since the Guatemalan crisis (FRUS, 1955-1957: 
680). White reported that until then Ruiz Cortines had not 
been friendly with him, but after Arbenz’ fall, the Presi-
dent invited him to an informal conversation. Since that 
day his visits to the presidential residence at nightfall had 
become a weekly routine. It did not seem to cross White’s 
mind that this shift in attitude of the Mexican President 
might have been related to the fear provoked by the coup 
against Arbenz. Several Latin American governments and 
Ruiz Cortines’ among them thought the same could hap-
pen to them. According to White, the change was due to 
the “stable elements” of Mexican society —bankers, the 
chambers of industry and commerce, and segments of the 
middle classes— had reacted against the peso devalua-
tion, but, most of all against the support for the Árbenz 
government. In his opinion the conservative opposition 
had been more influential than the left (Buchenau, 2004: 
133).
White boasted of having convinced the Mexican Pres-
ident that Communism posed a genuine threat to Guate-
mala and Mexico. So much so, he continued, that Ruiz 
Cortines had proposed to further the cooperation between 
the two governments to fight Communism (FRUS, 1955-
1957: 681). He also asked him to be discreet about their 
frequent exchanges. If they became public they could 
harm the government. Mexican public opinion was al-
ways distrustful of collaboration with the United States,37 
especially in security matters. Paradoxically, the Presi-
dential request revealed a lack of trust in the US that es-
caped the Ambassador’s judgment.
The US may not have interfered directly in Mexican 
domestic affairs. However, it put an indirect pressure that 
was merely suggested. Presidents Eisenhower and Ruiz 
Cortines met for a third time in White Sulphur Springs on 
26-27 March 1956. There Eisenhower made some sug-
gestions to Ruiz Cortines. He told him that “subversion” 
and “Communist infiltration” were a matter of serious 
concern for the US people. He did not directly ask him to 
break up diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but 
he warned the Mexican president that all Soviet embas-
sies were “centers of espionage, sabotage and subversive 
activities.”38 Ruiz Cortines agreed with his host on the 
need to reinforce the anti-Communist crusade. For Eisen-
hower this commitment seemed to be a necessary intro-
duction to any conversation with his allies. After that they 
proceeded to discuss trade and issues related to bilateral 
cooperation.39
By 1957 Ruiz Cortines had learned how to deal with 
Eisenhower’s obsession with Soviet expansion and the 
dissemination of Communism. He understood that Anti-
Communism guided the US President’s perception of the 
world and of his responsibilities as leader of the free 
world. Anti-Communism provided also the standard by 
which he measured the loyalty of his country’s allies. 
Ruiz Cortines understood that he could use the US Presi-
dent’s concerns in Mexico’s benefit. In the conversation 
the Mexican President had with the new US ambassador, 
Robert C.Hill, he thanked him for keeping their meetings 
confidential and for respecting Mexico’s self-determina-
tion. Ruiz Cortines stressed the importance of non-inter-
ference by external powers in the presidential succession.
That day the last part of the conversation was dedi-
cated to a description of Adolfo López Mateos’virtues. 
He was the PRI candidate for the presidency and his cam-
paign had just started. Ruiz Cortines wanted to give the 
US government all reassurances that he and his successor 
were alike. He said: “He is exactly like me.” “He knows 
how to treat Communists”, “As I do”, he added 
sibylline.40
EPiLOGUE
As the presidential succession in 1958 approached, 
President Ruiz Cortines decided to offset the destabiliz-
ing effect of political discrepancies within society. The 
first step in that direction was to concentrate in his hands 
the decision regarding the PRI presidential candidate. 
López Mateos´candidacy was not the result of a negotia-
tion among relevant political actors. He was chosen by 
Ruiz Cortines alone, who put in display all Presidential 
power. Secondly, he concentrated all his political energies 
in the building of an ample coalition comprising all those 
who identified with the Mexican Revolution, left and 
right. As a result López Mateos had the backing of Lom-
bardo’s Partido Popular Socialista, PPS, and of the retir-
ee military members of Partido Auténtico de la Revolu-
ción Mexicana, PARM. Ruiz Cortines wanted López 
Mateos to represent revolutionary unity. Therefore, in 
July 1958 the PRI-PPS-PARM candidate —candidate of 
all revolutionaries—, Adolfo López Mateos, had only one 
competitor —Luis Alvarez— the PAN candidate, who 
represented the adversaries of the Mexican Revolution. 
The 1958 election was the first one since 1940 that did 
not split the political elite. Nevertheless, rather than ex-
pressing agreement, the election showed the govern-
ment’s growing intolerance of dissent, and the weak insti-
tutional representation of political differences.
To what extent was this particular development in 
Mexican domestic politics a result of the cold war con-
text? The answer to this question suggests that the politi-
cal status quo in each Latin American country was con-
nected to the regional order. The comparison between the 
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Guatemalan experience of 1954 and the Cuban revolution 
a decade later indicates that the hemispheric order also 
contributed to sustain national political systems.
In a stable regional order, such as that prevailing in 
Latin America in 1954, domestic reforms were neither 
threatening to that order or to US hegemony, nor could 
they go very far. Whereas the transformation of the envi-
ronment brought about by the instability of US-Soviet re-
lations in 1961-1962, produced the setting of a Commu-
nist regime in Cuba and destabilized almost every other 
country in the region. This means that while national po-
litical systems are sensitive to changes in the external 
context, changes in the domestic context do not necessar-
ily affect the regional order. However, for President Ei-
senhower and his Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, the 
preservation of the internal status quo —even if it was 
undemocratic— in Latin American countries was a condi-
tion for the continuity of the regional order. From their 
perspective the durability of these political systems was 
of strategic interest for the US. However, history proved 
them wrong, because the disruption of the regional order 
caused by US intervention overturned the internal order 
of things.
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José Steinsleger recounts that, in August 1954, at a chance 
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